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iABSTRACT
With the rise of global value chains (GVCs) and the growing prominence of services as both facilitators or very objects of supply 
chain dynamics, it has become commonplace for goods and services to be supplied as a bundled offering within enterprise networks. 
Separated (politically) at birth since the launch of the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations that saw services placed for the 
first time on the world trade agenda, the goods and services divide reflected in today’s structure of global trade governance has 
increasingly come into question. The fact that goods and services are increasingly supplied together and that the manufacturing 
process itself offers evidence of ever-heightened co-mingling of goods and services production (for example, contract-based 
manufacturing; automobile or aircraft financing, and so on) begs the question of the desirability and political economy feasibility of 
pursuing economies of scale in global rule-making by fusing the law of goods and services trade into one undifferentiated whole.
This essay explores this case for fusing the law of goods with that of services in a world of trade in tasks and production 
fragmentation. It does so by directing attention to the questions of whether the current architectures of multilateral and preferential 
trade governance are compatible with a world of trade in tasks; whether the existing rules offer globally active firms a coherent 
structure for doing business in a predictable environment; whether it is feasible to redesign the structure and content of existing 
trade rules to align them to the reality of production fragmentation; and what steps can be envisaged to better align policy and 
realities in the marketplace if the prospects for restructuring appear unfavourable. 
The paper argues that fusing trade disciplines for goods and services is neither needed nor feasible and may actually deflect attention 
from a number of worthwhile policy initiatives where more realistic (if never easily secured) prospects of generic rule-making may 
well exist. What is needed is not so much rule-making unification between goods and services but rather more holistic negotiating 
frameworks that embrace the reality of the goods-services nexus in a pragmatic yet pro-active manner. Whether the increasingly 
diverse and fractured World Trade Organization (WTO) membership is currently capable of any form of policy pro-activeness 
remains, without doubt, an important open question. Still, examples abound of areas where useful, development-enhancing, 
synergies between goods and services trade and between trade and investment policy could readily be explored in a manner that 
would show greater responsiveness and adaptability to the reality of doing business today. Pursuing such synergies would require 
a commitment to negotiating parallelism with regard to both rule-making and market-opening objectives which has yet to gain 
currency in the Doha Round context nor been taken up extensively in preferential settings.
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BITs  bilateral investment treaties
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FDI  foreign direct investment 
FTAs  free trade agreements
GATS  General Agreement on Trade in Services 
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GPA Agreement on Government Procurement
GVCs  global value chains 
IP  intellectual property 
IT  information technology 
MFN  most favored nation 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
PTAs  preferential trade agreements 
RTAs  regional trade agreements
SMEs  small and medium-sized enterprises
SPS  Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
TBT  Technical Barriers to Trade
TISA  Trade in Services Agreement
TRIMs  Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TRIPS  Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights
TTIP  Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership 
TTP  Trans-Pacific Partnership 
WTO  World Trade Organization
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1BACKGROUND CONTEXTUAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
With the rise of global value chains (GVCs) and the growing 
prominence of services as both facilitators or very objects 
of supply chain dynamics, it has become commonplace for 
goods and services to be supplied as a bundled offering within 
enterprise networks. Separated (politically) at birth since the 
launch of the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations 
that saw services placed for the first time on the world 
trade agenda, the goods and services divide reflected in 
today’s structure of global trade governance has increasingly 
come into question. The fact that goods and services are 
increasingly supplied together and that the manufacturing 
process itself offers evidence of ever-heightened co-mingling 
of goods and services production (for example, contract-
based manufacturing; automobile or aircraft financing, and 
so on) begs the question of the desirability and political 
economy feasibility of pursuing economies of scale in global 
rule-making by fusing the law of goods and services trade into 
one undifferentiated whole. As the Swedish National Board of 
Trade (2013) noted in a recent study:
 The role of services both as enablers and tasks in GVCs 
requires re-examining current trading rules for services 
(e.g. WTO GATS [World Trade Organization General 
Agreement on Trade in Services] and services chapters 
in RTAs [regional trade agreements]). These rules are 
designed for application to services that are exported as 
final activities from national firms or service suppliers, and 
do not reflect the new reality where there are multiple 
suppliers and multiple locations for services activities, 
integrated into GVCs that might cross several borders. 
… Policy formulation needs to treat goods and services 
together, and not separately. 
This essay explores the case for fusing the law of goods with 
that of services in a world of trade in tasks and production 
fragmentation. It does so by directing attention to the 
following questions. 
(i) Are current architectures of multilateral and preferential 
trade governance compatible with a world of trade in 
tasks?
(ii) Do existing rules offer globally active firms a 
coherent structure for doing business in a predictable 
environment?
(iii)  How feasible is it to redesign the structure and content 
of existing trade rules to align them to the reality of 
production fragmentation? 
(iv)  If prospects for restructuring appear unfavourable, what 
steps can be envisaged to better align policy and realities 
in the marketplace? 
Context usually matters. The division at birth of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
GATS was largely political and ideological—and hence 
substantively artificial—in nature, rooted as it was in the 
North-South tensions that permeated the Uruguay Round’s 
launch. Such a divide reflected the prevailing mercantilist 
approach to agenda expansion, with developing countries 
resisting the inclusion of issue areas in which their export 
comparative advantage appeared weak or non-existent. It 
also reflected the reality of negotiations that started quite 
literally from a blank page, both empirically and analytically. 
Not surprisingly, the discovery journey that the GATS 
negotiations represented was characterized by strong doses 
of learning by doing and policy precaution, not least on the 
part of several developed countries that had yet to embrace 
market-friendly reforms in key service sectors. Confronted 
with a largely empty canvass, with little to cut and paste 
from past practice other than the provisions of the GATT, 
negotiators opted for the safer confines of a separate, 
self-contained, standalone set of rules, accepting that 
considerable learning externalities lay ahead of them. 
That was then, this is now. A quarter century later, and not 
least because of vastly improved (if still far from adequate) 
empirics, it is today possible to more fully appreciate, in the 
context of globalization’s second unbundling (see Baldwin 
2011) and the GVC-laden geography of trade and investment 
that has come in its wake, the dual nature of services as 
final and intermediate activities of central salience to the 
development process. Over this period, the export pessimism 
of developing countries has progressively given way to 
much greater levels of policy engagement with the sector 
as a growing number of them, including least developed 
ones, have come to embrace the information technology 
(IT) revolution and the scope it affords for supplying services 
remotely (overcoming what for many is the dual tyranny 
of geography and market size) and inserting their small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) into regional and global 
value chains. 
Autonomous policy has derived unprecedented virtue from a 
growing recognition of the above realities. This is so even as 
such developments have, for a variety of tactical and other 
reasons, garnered significantly less traction at the negotiating 
table, particularly at the multilateral level. The resulting 
paradox is a world whose doing business reality and domestic 
regulatory ecosystems geared towards reaping the benefits 
of the ongoing services revolution have raced well ahead of 
2HOW ALIKE ARE GOODS 
AND SERVICES?
The fusion of trade law in goods and services can only 
meaningfully proceed if the substantive remit of trade rules 
governing each of the two legal instruments is sufficiently 
proximate as to make lingering differences relatively 
inconsequential. How close are we to such reality? As it 
happens, proximity is arguably less than first meets the eye. 
The first few years of GATS negotiations, and especially the 
so-called “sectoral testing” exercise that sought to assess the 
relevance and applicability of various trade concepts applied 
to services transactions, revealed a number of important 
innate characteristics of services trade suggesting the need 
for rule-making distinctiveness. Several such distinctions bear 
recalling.
DISTINCT FEATURES OF SERVICES TRADE
Intangibility 
First, intangibility and the measurement challenges deriving 
from that. The relative paucity and significantly lesser degree 
of sector-specific disaggregated data is a well-known hurdle 
to credible empirical work in services trade. But this first 
defining characteristic need not per se pose a major obstacle 
to rule-making fusion so far as services negotiations chiefly 
concern, in a manner analogous to TBT or SPS negotiations, 
regulatory measures (laws and regulations) and not border 
measures (tariffs). Nor do services negotiations lend 
themselves easily to (quantity-based) formulaic approaches 
to market opening. The measurement problems stemming 
from the intangible nature of services transactions do, 
however, hamper the development and use of the credible 
metrics required for implementing emergency safeguard 
measures for services (that is, quantifying injury and 
establishing beyond reasonable doubt that causality exists 
between a measurable import surge and the resulting injury 
to domestic producers), determining the origin of services 
embedded in goods, and for calculating subsidy margins for 
purposes of contingent protection determinations. In all 
three respects, extending the GATT law to services would 
likely run into crippling problems of empirical determination.
 
Non-storability, a Multiplicity of Modes, and the Need 
for Factor Movement
Non-storability, the multiplicity of modes of supplying 
services, and the inherent need for factor movement 
governance structures and rules putatively designed to anchor 
and help secure such benefits. 
The question arises of whether the changes described above 
are of such a magnitude as to warrant a radical overhaul of 
the trading system’s structure and modus operandi. Tempting 
as this might seem, particularly for those services aficionados 
frustrated by two decades of negotiating stalemate on the 
shores of Lake Léman, this paper argues that fusing trade 
disciplines for goods and services is neither needed nor 
feasible and may actually deflect attention from a number 
of worthwhile policy initiatives where more realistic (if never 
easily secured) prospects of generic rule-making may well 
exist.
 
In detailing why and how such a conclusion is derived, 
the paper starts off counterfactually by pointing first to 
the considerable diversity of norms governing the various 
dimensions of trade in goods. The law of goods trade shows 
at least as much—if not more—divergence and a lack of 
centralized coherence as that on display under the GATS. 
Indeed, the alphabet soup of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM), Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) Agreements, while all governing goods trade, are 
all separate from the GATT, arguably more so than the 
multiplicity of sectoral annexes under the GATS, all of which 
are nonetheless anchored to the Agreement’s horizontal 
set of framework disciplines. Has the far-reaching degree 
of rule-making distinctiveness governing goods trade led to 
significant incoherence in rule design or implementation? 
The fact that a call for rule-making fusion is not being voiced 
on the goods trade side suggests that the answer is firmly 
in the negative. Moreover, if the case for rule-making fusion 
between goods and services trade was so compelling, why is 
it that none of the mega-regional trade agreements currently 
under negotiation, particularly the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), proceed on this basis? Their proponents 
regularly tout their state–of-the-art attributes as enlightened 
citadels of 21st century trade governance, which are led by 
trading powers with proven first-mover rule design capacity 
and highly service-centric economies. Meanwhile, within 
the more narrow confines of services trade negotiations 
themselves, the ongoing plurilateral talks towards what 
is also trumpeted as a cutting-edge Trade in Services 
Agreement (TISA), divorced as they are from the WTO’s 
trade architecture, can only further entrench the dichotomy 
between goods and services trade law rather than serve a 
fusion-enticing purpose.
3(capital and labor) in services trade and their complex 
(and complicating) political economies come next. Early 
Uruguay Round discussions on services witnessed several 
(recalcitrant) developing countries arguing in favor of a 
GATT-like definition of trade in services, limiting the remit 
of a future GATS solely to cross-border supply (Mode 1 
trade). Had such an approach been taken, the GATS would 
have covered less than a quarter of world services trade 
and ignored three modes of supply—consumption abroad 
(for example, tourism, health, education); commercial 
presence (foreign direct investment [FDI] in services); and 
the movement of natural persons (for example, the supply 
of professional and other business services), whose combined 
impact on development and value chain insertion are 
today widely considered of vital importance to developing 
country export prospects. While trade in services cannot 
meaningfully be envisaged in the absence of parallel factor 
flows, such is not the case for goods trade, where trade 
and investment have traditionally been separate in treaty 
terms. Quite apart that there currently exists no multilateral 
set of investment disciplines to draw from, fusing the law 
of the GATT and GATS would imply first an acceptance on 
the part of the WTO membership of the need for a global 
mandate on investment extending to both goods and 
services, and a subsequent incorporation of GATS Mode 
3 disciplines and commitments into a new generic WTO 
investment instrument. While the case for revisiting the role 
of investment, particularly FDI, in trade governance appears 
decisively stronger in a GVC world, a reality that preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) have acted on since the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was concluded in 
the mid-1990s (without, however, fusing goods and services 
trade law per se), crafting a generic set of investment 
disciplines in the WTO would confront Members with the 
delicate challenge of re-opening Mode 3 commitments and 
revisiting the delicate balance of market access benefits 
woven into the GATS and the WTO more broadly. Still, as is 
argued below, such efforts are worthy of focused attention in 
negotiating circles. 
Contrasting political economies of non-discrimination
Absent border protection in the form of tariffs, domestic 
regulation forms the sole currency of services negotiations 
and the source of discriminatory or market access-impeding 
conduct. This reality, to which the high(er) incidence of 
regulatory intervention present in services markets needs 
to added, singularly complicates the quest for making 
national treatment a GATT-like general obligation from 
which derogations are generally prohibited (other than 
those relating to the creation of PTAs). In both the GATS, 
where national treatment applies à la carte in the form of 
scheduled commitments, or in negative list PTAs, where 
national treatment derogations of variable scope (from 
specific measures to entire sectors in the manner of unbound 
measures under the GATS) are made possible through 
reservations lists, the principle of national treatment is 
far more relative than absolute. As regards most favored 
nation (MFN) treatment, the trading system’s other bedrock 
principle of non-discrimination, political economy factors 
once more explain differentiated treatment, as between the 
GATT and GATS. While the MFN principle is, unlike national 
treatment, a general obligation under both legal orders, in 
services trade, owing once more to far more acute sectoral 
interests (reflected in private or bureaucratic rent-seeking 
conduct), the principle applies in a more flexible manner by 
allowing derogations to be lodged. To date, close to 600 
MFN-inconsistent measures have been notified under the 
GATS Article II list of exemptions, and PTAs covering services 
are similarly dotted with such reserved measures, particularly 
in developed countries with longer traditions of complex 
sectoral regulation and more deeply entrenched forms of 
rent-seeking. 
High prevalence of quantity-based restrictions to trade 
and investment in services
Prohibited by definition—a per se offense—under the GATT, 
quantitative restrictions are pervasively used to limit the 
quantum of competition in services markets and are thus 
permissible. But they are somewhat confusingly codified 
under provisions (GATS Article XVI) that cover both 
quantitative and qualitative, as well as discriminatory and 
non-discriminatory measures—under the GATS and in PTAs 
covering services trade and investment. There seems little 
scope here for legal reconciliation. 
High incidence of market failure and regulatory intensity 
of services trade
The negotiating agenda in services if fully akin to non-tariff 
discussions in goods trade, but with the important caveat 
that powerful sectoral regulators in services (mostly from 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD] countries) have put up strong resistance to the 
idea of embedding into the GATS or in the services chapters 
of PTAs TBT- or SPS-like disciplines on necessity and 
proportionality for services trade. Accordingly, there are 
no credible means other than through weaker nullification 
and impairment grounds to challenge (under the GATS or 
PTAs) non-discriminatory regulatory measures that may be 
unduly burdensome or act as disguised restrictions to trade 
in services. A quarter century of protracted discussions of 
these matters within the GATS Working Group on Domestic 
Regulation, mirrored in PTAs, offers decidedly tepid solace to 
trade law fusion supporters. 
High degree of sectoral specificity
This imparts strong doses of verticality to the GATS 
construct. These are needed both to assuage a multiplicity of 
powerful sectoral ministries and regulatory bodies involved in 
regulatory governance and to respond to genuinely distinct 
sectoral challenges in market opening and underlying 
regulation. Services negotiations have made clear, both 
multilaterally and preferentially, that a GATT-like, one-
size-fits-all approach to trade governance commands little 
political or analytical appeal.
4Unfinished rule-making agenda
The rule-making agenda of the GATS (and of PTAs) remains 
unfinished, connoting an underlying preference for rule-
making abstinence. Deprived of sufficient time (offering 
further evidence of the Uruguay Round’s blank page 
syndrome), negotiators carried forward discussions across 
a large and substantively daunting set of unfinished rule-
making business. This concerned the four “leftover” issues 
of emergency safeguards, subsidy disciplines, government 
procurement, and the development of disciplines on 
necessity in domestic service sector regulation. With the 
exception of government procurement, where far-reaching 
Agreement on Government Procurement- (GPA) plus 
market-opening can be found, all of the above areas of 
services rule-making have also floundered within preferential 
confines. Once more, such repeat failure—and the underlying 
regulatory preference it clearly connotes—would appear 
suggestive of a difficult fusion journey.
Undesirability of extending trade remedy disciplines to 
services trade 
A fusion of the GATT and the GATS would imply that 
contingent protection measures—and the generally weak 
multilateral disciplines governing their use—would extend 
to services. Doing so commands generally low appeal among 
most observers, not least because the history of anti-dumping 
has generally not been a happy one when looked at through 
the lens of economic efficiency, even as such instruments of 
protection typically command widespread appeal in industry 
circles. There is little doubt, for instance, that European and 
American airlines would seek dumping or countervailing duty 
investigations against carriers in the Gulf region accused of a 
combination of state-supported unfair trading practices. Quite 
apart from the paradoxical fact that it was these very airlines—
and the governments beholden to them—that conspired to 
exclude the bulk of civil aviation from the ambit of modern 
services tradecraft, it is far from certain that consumer welfare 
would be well served through such action. A further paradox 
TABLE 1:
Key Trade Policy Issues and their Treatment across the Goods-Services Divide
Issue Goods Services
National treatment General obligation 
under GATT Art. III
A la carte under GATS Art. XVII; absent tariffs/border protection. A general 
obligation under negative list PTAs subject to measure- or sector-specific 
derogating reservations.
Quantitative 
restrictions
Per se offense under 
GATT Art. XI
Fully permissible but subject to scheduling under GATS Art. XVI. Identical 
treatment in PTAs.
MFN General obligation 
under GATT Art. I
General obligation under GATS Art. II but subject to listing derogations under Annex 
II (500+ MFN-inconsistent measures have been notified). Identical treatment under 
PTAs. 
Necessity/
proportionality
Subject to TBT/SPS 
disciplines; large body of 
GATT jurisprudence
Unfinished agenda under GATS Art. VI; weaker nullification and impairment 
disciplines, and strong resistance from regulatory communities, especially in OECD 
countries. Identical treatment under PTAs.
Subsidy disciplines Subject to ASCM and 
AoG
Unfinished agenda under GATS Art. XV (clear revealed preference for regulatory 
inaction). Identical treatment under PTAs.
Emergency 
safeguard 
measures
Subject to GATT Art. 
XIX
Unfinished agenda under GATS Art. X (clear revealed preference for regulatory 
inaction). Legitimate doubts expressed over the feasibility and desirability of 
embedding GATT-type disciplines to services trade given data limitations and the 
multiplicity of modes of supplying services. Identical treatment in PTAs.
TRIMs Covered Service sector TRIMs are not addressed in the WTO but covered in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and in the investment chapters of PTAs. No disciplines 
on forced localization though local presence disciplines in several PTAs could be of 
relevance as a potential discipline. 
Trade remedies Covered Not addressed
TRIPS Covered Not addressed
Digital trade Coverage limited 
to the Ministerial 
commitment on 
duty-free exchanges of 
digital products.
No coverage under the GATS but provisions on digital trade embedded in the 
services rules of an increasing number of PTAs.
5NEEDED: GREATER 
COHERENCE IN 
THE CONDUCT OF 
NEGOTIATIONS AND 
EXPLORING THE SCOPE 
FOR HORIZONTAL RULE-
MAKING 
What is needed—and likely more feasible—is not so much 
rule-making unification between goods and services but 
rather more holistic negotiating frameworks that embrace 
the reality of the goods-services nexus in a pragmatic yet 
pro-active manner. Whether the increasingly diverse and 
fractured WTO membership is currently capable of any 
form of policy pro-activeness remains, without doubt, an 
lies in the negotiating paralysis and clearly revealed preference 
for regulatory inaction flowing from a quarter century of 
fruitless WTO discussions on subsidy disciplines for services 
(see Sauvé and Marta Soprana 2015) or the development of 
emergency safeguard measures analogous to those obtaining 
under GATT Article 18. 
Table 1 below offers a summary of key distinctions between 
goods and services and their differentiated treatment 
under trade law. The conclusion that can be drawn from 
the discussion so far is that the case for rule-making fusion 
appears weak on both political economy and technical 
feasibility grounds. Moreover, just because goods and 
services are more closely intertwined in a world of production 
fragmentation does not in itself justify the need for unified 
global rules. This may be so because GVCs are, more 
often than not, regional rather than global in character 
(Estevadeordal et al. 2013). The burgeoning empirical 
literature on GVCs tends to show that Friedman’s proclaimed 
end of geography (2005) is as unlikely as Fukuyama’s end 
of history (1992) has been shown to be. A crucial element 
of rule-making subsidiarity appears at play here, with PTAs 
responding to the predominantly regional fragmentation 
of production networks by operating the most important 
fusion—that between trade and investment, and, in the case 
of those agreements featuring comprehensive investment 
norms, doing so in a manner that straddles the goods and 
services divide. 
important open question. Still, examples abound of areas 
where useful, development-enhancing, synergies between 
goods and services trade and between trade and investment 
policy could readily be explored in a manner that would show 
greater responsiveness and adaptability to the reality of 
doing business today. Pursuing such synergies would require 
a commitment to negotiating parallelism with regard to both 
rule-making and market-opening objectives which has yet 
to gain currency in the Doha Round context nor been taken 
up extensively in preferential settings. Three such examples 
come to mind.
 
(i) Complementing the ongoing negotiations under the 
GATT’s Information Technology Agreement (the so-
called ITA-II talks) with a cluster of closely aligned 
information and communications technology (ICT) 
services components under the GATS (see Makiyama 
2011).
 
(ii) Completing the Bali Ministerial mandate on trade 
facilitation (pursued rather narrowly under the GATT) 
with the logistics-transport-border management cluster 
of services best able to give lasting commercial meaning 
to the facilitation of trade.
(iii)  Exploring the nexus between environmental goods 
and services, where development-enhancing synergies 
would appear entirely feasible and within reach to all 
but tunnel vision-challenged trade negotiators (see 
National Board of Trade 2014). 
Beyond efforts at promoting complimentary forms of 
negotiating parallelism between the GATT and GATS, all 
of which are rooted in negotiations currently under way, 
several new rule-making fronts offer genuine prospects for 
forward-looking evolutionary changes in multilateral trade 
governance. Box 1 offers a quick glance at some of the policy 
options available to negotiators seeking to move the trading 
system in the direction of greater GVC responsiveness.
POLICY LINKAGES
Pursuing some of the policy linkages discussed below appears 
not only feasible today but also largely overdue, not least in 
light of developments within PTAs. Other such linkages are 
considerably more contentious and may indeed be viewed 
as resting on shakier analytical or developmental grounds. 
Yet all are worthy of evidence-based policy dialogue. Among 
such policy linkages are the following.
Embedding a comprehensive set of investment norms in 
the WTO architecture
Such a set of investment norms would cover both goods 
and services and span the protection and liberalization 
dimensions of investment rule making. The E15’s work on 
GVCs, pursued across several Expert Groups, has established 
6Embedding a generic set of multilateral norms on labor 
mobility
If the investment surgery proposed above could be 
performed, it would offer the further benefit of freeing 
Mode 4 trade from its current services shackle and allow 
the multilateral community to think harder about the 
pros and cons of a standalone, generic set of disciplines on 
trade-related labor movement divorced from the goods 
and services divide. While internationally mobile workers 
inevitably sell their labor as a service, there is no reason 
for Mode 4 trade to relate exclusively to service industries. 
Elevating the importance of enlarged negotiations on 
labor movement and making it conceptually equal to how 
investment is treated under trade law would likely allow 
enlarged, development-enhancing bargains to be struck 
in areas of key export interest to developing countries. 
Underlying trends in global demographics and structural 
supply-demand mismatches in many countries’ labor 
markets (especially those of richer nations) suggest that 
the scope for enlightened reciprocity is far greater than 
is currently being pursued or envisaged, including with 
respect to workers with lower levels of skill. A new path on 
beyond reasonable doubt that a strong case exists to 
revisit the role and place of investment alongside trade in a 
revamped system of global economic governance. The rising 
tide of cross-border investment activity, the unrelenting 
intensification of locational competition, particularly over 
efficiency-seeking forms of investment, and the quality 
of regulatory ecosystems to which FDI responds in a world 
of trade in tasks all require a fresh reappraisal in a trade 
policy setting. Doing so would allow a constructive dialogue 
to proceed on the pros and cons of adopting horizontal 
investment disciplines that would cease to operate artificial 
distinctions between goods and services. It would also 
entail, for the sake of coherence, that existing Mode 3 
commitments under the GATS migrate into a new generic 
WTO investment instrument and benefit from the more 
complete set of protection disciplines available under 
investment law. Important questions of feasibility would 
doubtless need to be confronted in attempting such an 
architectural overhaul, not least on the existing balance of 
benefits under the GATS and what would remain of it once 
the most commercially salient mode of supplying services 
was removed.1 Is this doable? One need look no further than 
to the WTO’s periphery, where a majority of preferential 
trade and investment agreements today do just that, limiting 
services rule making and liberalization to cross-border 
transactions by fusing Modes 1 (cross-border supply) and 2 
(consumption abroad).
BOX 1:
The Trade Negotiating Implications of Servicification: Policy Options
In a recent contribution to its ongoing exploration of the trade policy implications of production fragmentation, the National Board 
of Trade of Sweden envisaged three possible policy options of relevance to this paper’s discussion. 
A first option would be to negotiate goods and services together, i.e. a cluster approach. With the exception of the 
Government Procurement Agreement in the WTO, trade negotiations and agreements keep goods and services well 
separated from each other. If related services and goods were negotiated together in clusters, it could enable negotiators 
to address barriers faced by servicified companies in a comprehensive way. An integrated approach has been suggested for 
several sectors, both within the DDA [Doha Development Agenda] framework and outside. An argument against cluster 
approaches is that it is difficult to draw the line as to what to include. 
A second option would be to negotiate clusters of services only. This could be done without any large changes in the 
negotiation frameworks. The problem of delimitation would be the same of course. Clusters could be one way to address 
now rather neglected areas that are important to servicified firms in a structured way. For greater effect, any type of cluster 
could also be combined with regulatory commitments specific for the sectors, regarding for example competition, TBT-like 
restrictions, licensing, access to networks and trade facilitation.
A third option would involve a rationalization of services negotiations by agreeing on horizontal benchmarks that would 
remove certain barriers to Mode 3 and Mode 4 across sectors. Such barriers could for example include local content 
requirements, demands for joint ventures and economic needs tests for establishment. Similarly, a horizontal approach 
might yield more business friendly results in Mode 4 as opposed to the current piecemeal approach. As in recent EU 
FTAs [European Union free trade agreements], all sectors that are opened for establishment should also allow entry of 
key personnel for operating the new establishment. Similar treatment could be extended to service suppliers without an 
establishment in the country of delivery, for example in order to deliver training and installation services for products.”
Source: National Board of Trade (2012).
The resistance of both national and international bureaucrats and 
bureaucracies should not be underestimated in this regard given that trade 
and investment policy are often treated under different agencies or units 
within governments or international organizations.
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7labor movement would need to reduce the current bias in 
negotiated commitments favoring labor movement linked 
predominantly to cross-border investment activity—hence 
to the negotiating interests of capital-exporting countries. 
No one should doubt the scale of resistance that efforts 
targeting such an overhaul would most assuredly confront 
given the backlash against illegal or strife-induced migratory 
pressures and the deeply entrenched propensity in policy 
circles to equate temporary work-related labor mobility 
with more permanent forms of migration. Still, the case for 
enlightened governance responses at the interface of cross-
border trade, investment, and labor flows remains strong, 
including on moral grounds (Rogoff 2015; Pritchett 2006).
Extending TRIMs disciplines to services trade
The anchoring of a comprehensive set of investment 
disciplines in the WTO would of necessity raise the 
question, long addressed in a large number of PTAs, of 
extending disciplines prohibiting various types of trade- 
(and investment-) distorting performance requirements to 
services trade. While the case for doing so appears generally 
weak on development grounds given the pervasiveness of 
market failure confronting would-be SME GVC suppliers 
in many developing (and small) country settings, the 
precedent set by PTAs and the path-dependent manner in 
which such disciplines have been routinely carried forward 
suggest a degree of host country complicity (or recurring 
host country negotiating negligence). Extending the remit of 
TRIMs disciplines to services trade would offer a potentially 
attractive disciplinary anchor to industry interests directly 
concerned by the recent proliferation of forced localization 
policies and other local presence requirements, particularly 
in the digital sphere. Debates over forced localization 
practices inevitably dovetail with matters of data privacy, 
the regulation of cross-border data flows, and the taxation 
of transactions in cyber-space. All of these arguably need to 
command global governance responses that even PTAs have 
only tepidly begun to supply, and movement on this front 
will likely prove slow and contentious in the global arena 
(Miyakama 2014).
Extending TRIPS disciplines to services
The blistering pace of product and process innovation in 
services has thrown up significant challenges to intellectual 
property (IP) protection regimes in the sector, ones that 
are weakly or inadequately addressed by existing global 
norms. While discussions of IP issues are almost always and 
everywhere prone to significant policy debate and conflicting 
public-private interests, there would appear to be no 
inherently cogent rationale for addressing the trade-related 
aspects of IP in a segmented manner under the GATT’s sole 
ambit. The case for stringent IP protection in services may, 
however, display considerable sectoral variance, with the 
open source logic of less IP stringency in some segments of 
the digital economy confronting demands for significantly 
stronger doses of IP protection (for instance, copyrights in 
creative industries).
Revisiting the trade-investment-competition nexus
Another undeserving Singapore Issue casualty, the interface 
of trade and competition, which is increasingly viewed 
as concerning the potentially trade-, investment-, and 
competition-distorting practices of state-owned enterprises, 
requires renewed policy dialogue that once more needs to 
be conceptually divorced from the goods-services divide. 
The salience of competition law and pro-competitive 
regulation has long been plain to all those involved in 
services negotiations, not least because of the large number 
of service sectors with network properties that continue to 
display high degrees of market concentration even in the 
presence of far-reaching market-opening commitments. 
With globalization inducing pressures for heightened scale, 
market concentration and the abuse of dominance that may 
come in its wake, this calls for a complimentary alignment of 
trade, investment, competition law, and policy on pursuing 
open markets. 
Promoting regulatory coherence
Regulatory simplicity and efficiency are increasingly 
regarded as important determinants of competitiveness 
and economy-wide performance. They can also condition 
the ability of a country—and its firms—to capture various 
“tasks” in value chains. This is particularly important for 
SMEs. A critical examination of how to harness WTO law 
to achieve greater regulatory efficiency will be necessary 
so that regulations do not impose themselves as needlessly 
burdensome or protectionist bottlenecks in the value chain 
creation process. Agreements on regulatory coherence, 
whether through the adoption of general or sector-specific 
principles (or a likely combination of both), are seen as 
increasingly essential in this regard. As Sweden’s National 
Board of Trade (2013) correctly pointed out in a recent 
study, the quality of institutions is also an important factor 
in the development of goods and services value chains as 
it affects the quality and effectiveness of the underlying 
regulatory environment. This is often critical for attracting 
efficiency-seeking FDI. At play in a number of the most 
prominent mega-regional or plurilateral agreements 
currently under negotiation (TTIP, TPP, TISA), the quest for 
multilateral disciplines on regulatory coherence is likely to 
proceed iteratively from the juridical precedents established 
within the WTO system’s periphery. However, a word of 
caution is warranted on discussions to do with advancing the 
principles of necessity and proportionality in services trade. 
While both principles feature prominently under the GATT 
(in the TBT and SPS Agreements) and should ideally inform 
any journey aimed at facilitating trade and investment 
through regulatory temperance, the resistance of vertically 
powerful service sector regulators (especially in developed 
countries) has long posed an obstacle to moving forward. 
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